by the threat of override on the part of Member States, acting collectively, and the threat of noncompliance on the part of any single Member State government. They summarize their findings as follows (449): "Our analysis provides systematic evidence that judges at the ECJ are sensitive to these two constraints. Moreover, these threats have a substantively large effect on judicial rulings." Third, CGH revive a classic debate in scholarship on European integration, claiming (449) that their findings support Intergovernmentalist theory, while conflicting with Neofunctionalist claims. Because this paper was published in a prominent venue, the American Political Science Review, and because CGH report findings that are at odds with every important empirical study on the topic of the paper ever published, each of these claims deserves close scrutiny.
METHOD AND RESEARCH DESIGN
There is nothing novel in CGH's approach to the ECJ's rulings. All of the scholars who have undertaken major research on CGH's chosen topic analyze the Court's rulings on specific legal questions, though they go well beyond CGH's primitive approach.
Since Stein's (1981) seminal paper on "The Making of a Transnational Constitution" of the Treaty of Rome, scholars have examined the relationship between (a) the legal arguments contained in the amici briefs filed by the Member States and the Commission in litigation before the Court, and (b) the rulings of the Court. These briefs -"Observations" in EU parlanceadvise the ECJ on how it should rule on the various legal questions that constitute any given case. The briefs embody revealed preferences in a legalistic form. Stein developed the approach as one means of assessing the influence of Member State preferences, and those of the Commission, on 11 of the ECJ's foundational, "constitutional" rulings. He found that none of the signatories of the Rome Treaty filed a brief in support of any of the Court's major moves, while each of the Member States opposed the Court in at least one of them. These decisions fundamentally "transformed" the treaty system (Weiler 1991) , "constitutionalizing" it in all but name (Lenaerts 1990 , Mancini 1991 . 2 Stein's findings are directly relevant to CGH's claims. If the legal system actually operated according to the dictates of CGH's model, this transformation would not have occurred, and the system would not have generated the data that CGH analyze.
Consider Van Gend en Loos (1963) , 3 perhaps the most important ruling the Court has ever rendered. In that case, the briefing parties battled over "direct effect," whether a provision of the Treaty of Rome could be pleaded by a private litigant in a national court, against a Member State act. The underlying question was a momentous one: did the Treaty confer upon individuals and firms legal "rights" that national judges must protect, even against decisions taken by their own national governments? Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands had taken a collective decision to violate the Treaty, raising customs duties which harmed an importer, who sued in Dutch courts. When the case arrived before the ECJ, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands forcefully argued that the rights and obligations contained in the Rome
Treaty were addressed to the Member States, not to individuals. In fact, the Member States had expressly chosen not to provide for the direct effect of Treaty provisions in national legal orders.
Of the six members of the system, only France and Italy were not involved in the fray. Prompted by the Dutch judge of reference, and urged on by the Commission, the Court declared that the Treaty provision in question was "directly effective," and the plaintiff won. Neither the fact of non-compliance, nor the threat of override, constrained the ECJ. In subsequent cases, the Court 2 The constitutionalization of the EU refers to the process by which the Rome Treaty evolved from a set of legal arrangements binding upon sovereign states into a vertically integrated legal regime conferring judicially enforceable rights and obligations on legal persons, public and private, within EC territory. The phrase thus captures the transformation of an intergovernmental organization governed by international law, into a quasi-federal legal system. For discussion of constitutionalization and its effects, see Stone Sweet (2004: ch. 2 extended the scope of its direct effect doctrines to cover a major class of EU statutes, called directives; and the ECJ announced and developed its supremacy doctrine, the rule that in every conflict between an EU legal norm and a national law or practice that arises before a national judge, the EU norm must prevail. 4 Stein focused on the foundational cases, in part, because the Member States had chosen not to include a supremacy clause in the Treaty of Rome, nor had they provided for the direct effect of treaty provisions and directives. Yet, on the basis of the ECJ's positions on direct effect, supremacy, and other "constitutional" doctrines, 5 such as state liability (discussed below), the ECJ, national judges, and private litigants constructed a decentralized system for enforcing
Member State compliance with EU law. As preliminary references from the national courts steadily rose under Article 267 (formerly Article 234, see Appendix), and then exploded, the ECJ found itself at the center of virtually every important policy question faced by the Member
States. As has been well-documented, the Court has exercised decisive influence on the overall course of market and political integration, and on thousands of policy outcomes great and small. 6 Comparatively, the significance of the ECJ's impact on its legal and political environment rivals that of the world's most powerful national supreme, or constitutional, courts. The consolidation of supremacy and direct effect as an operative feature of the system is a necessary causal condition for all of this to happen. Thus, before moving on to more mundane matters, we repeat:
CGH have chosen to study a legal system that developed through rulings that unambiguously count as evidence against their own theory, as CGH themselves have specified it in their hypotheses (discussed below). 4 According to the ECJ, once a European legal norm enters into force, it "renders automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of … national law" (Simmenthal, ECJ 106/77, 1978) , including national constitutional rules. 5 For a summary of the case law, see Stone Sweet (2004: 64-71) . 6 For a review of the scholarly literature on the impact of the ECJ on integration, EU policymaking, and national law and politics, see Stone Sweet (2010) .
In the 1990s, political scientists refined Stein's method, to make it more rigorous and amenable to quantitative analysis (beginning with Kilroy 1996; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998) . Political scientists then began to apply it, relatively systematically (within legal-policy domains, comparatively across domains, and diachronically). By the time CGH began their research, the method they claim to have originated had become standard in the field; indeed, it had been deployed in the major projects that CGH explicitly criticize in their paper (e.g., Stone Sweet and Cichowski 2004; , and others they chose not to cite (e.g., Cichowski 1998 Cichowski , 2004 Cichowski , 2007 McCown 2003; Nykios 2003 Nykios , 2006 [W]e develop a novel measurement strategy for coding court decisions. Decisions by the ECJ … often consist of multiple legal issues over which the court may not always favor the same side. Summarizing the decision as pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant, which is common practice, therefore ignores potentially important variation in court behavior and, at a minimum, introduces measurement error. We avoid this problem by creating a dataset of decisions on within-case legal issues rather than cases themselves (CGH 436).
If this passage accurately describes their method, then CGH's approach to the Court's rulings adds nothing new to the basic method employed by every scholar who has engaged in serious empirical research on CGH's topic since Stein. 8 In fact, it is standard practice in this field of research for scholars to analyze the Court's position on each legal question briefed by a Member State and the Commission, in each ruling analyzed. For Article 267 preliminary rulings, the analyst will also note which party is likely to prevail before the national judge, where it is possible to make that determination. This "issueby-issue" approach is all but required given the nature of the Court's decision-making under Article 267. In important Article 267 cases, the national judge of reference typically asks the Court to answer multiple legal questions. In its responses to these questions, the ECJ at times makes it clear which party in the dispute ought to prevail, given the facts and the ECJ's interpretation of the applicable EU law; other times, the ECJ provides the interpretation but leaves to the national judge to decide how to apply it; in some cases, the ECJ reformulates one or more of the questions, or answers some but not all questions, and so on. Often enough to matter a great deal, the question of which party actually wins or loses is less important than how the Court interprets the law, in so far as such interpretation will determine how the system operates, or the law develops, in the future.
Consider another momentous preliminary ruling, Costa (1964) . 9 The significance of the decision for the development of the system is not that the plaintiff, Mr. Costa, "lost," or that the defendant, the Italian national gas company, "won," though the ECJ dismissed the claim alleging Italian non-compliance. Rather, the Court used the dispute to announce its doctrine of supremacy, which Italy had opposed in its brief. It is true that CGH select their cases differently. Whereas others (e.g., analyzed all of the rulings rendered in multiple domains of EU law and policy, CGH examine all of the rulings rendered in a specific time frame. CGH do not give us any reason to think that this difference should matter and, in fact, it does not matter, as we will show. The novelty of CGH's article, it turns out, lies entirely in the claim that their analysis shows that the ECJ and the legal system are systematically constrained by two mechanisms: the threat of override, and the threat of non-compliance.
There is broad scholarly consensus today on the view that the ECJ has been an important force, in part, because its pro-integrative rulings are effectively insulated from Member State override (e.g., Alter 2008 Alter , 2009 Cichowski 2004 Cichowski , 2007 Pollack 2003; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998; Tallberg 2000 Tallberg , 2002 . 11 The underlying rationale is straightforward: on virtually any controversial issue on which the Court will take a legal position, the Member States themselves are likely to be divided; one cannot expect them to be 10 Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137 (1803) . The importance of Marbury famously lies not in who won or lost (the Court's ruling on the point is a lesson in judicial deference), but in Marshall's assertion that the power of constitutional judicial review inheres in the grant of judicial authority under Article III of the Constitution. 11 To our knowledge, apart from CGH, no one since Garrett (1993 Garrett ( , 1995 and Garrett, Kelemen, and Schultz (1998) have argued that the threat of override is credible and has had a systemic impact on the ECJ's rulings. non-compliance cases routinely and effectively, which it does, is not to assert that "governments are constrained to obey adverse court rulings"; the latter statement raises a separate empirical question which CGH, unlike everyone else in the field, choose not to study.
The Hypotheses
CGH do not actually design their research to test the robustness of the threat of override, or the threat of non-compliance, as constraints on the ECJ's decision-making.
Let us begin with the override mechanism, represented by Hypothesis 1: "The more credible the threat of override … the more likely the court is to rule in favor of the governments' favored position" (CGH 439). So far, so good. CGH further suggest, reasonably, that "the threat of legislative override increases with the likelihood that a sufficiently large coalition of member states would pursue legislation or treaty revision in response to an ECJ ruling" (440). They then load the dice in favor of their preferred position -that the threat of override is a credible one -stipulating that the decision-rule governing override will always be QM. They justify this claim as follows (440) With respect to non-compliance, CGH (439) propose Hypothesis 2: "The more opposition a litigant government has from other member-state governments, the more likely the 12 In their coding protocol, CGH state that they would code the "legal basis" of the EU law being adjudicated by the Court. If so, then they have all the information required, since the legal basis determines the override rule. 13 The result is not surprising. The Unanimity override rule governs: all rulings that apply the Treaty of Rome [now the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU], including all cases in the domains of free movement of goods, services, and workers, anti-trust, and every legal basis dispute under Article 263; all rulings that concern EU legislation adopted under unanimity rules, the vast majority of statutes litigated in CGH's data set; all rulings pursuant to Article 267 preliminary questions related to direct effect, supremacy, remedies, and fundamental rights (all of which flow from either the Treaty or the general principles that have the same status as treaty law); and more. 14 The only passage wherein CGH discuss log-rolling is the following: "Override requires a government, or set of governments, opposed to the Court's preferred ruling to cobble together a logroll. Further, protocols can ease the logrolling process in treaty revision" (CGH 2008: 436 and a subsequent finding of non-compliance. Further, CGH pretend that the Commission, private litigants, and national judges do not exist, despite the fact that these actors are crucial to how the system operates, and the fact that their activities are directly relevant to the costs of noncompliance. We reject this model of the system.
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In any event, CGH have no intention of testing whether threats of override or noncompliance constrain the Court. With respect to override, they operationalize Hypothesis 1 so as to make it virtually identical to Hypothesis 2. CGH write:
For treaty revision and legislation requiring unanimity, the override only succeeds if all governments support the action. Thus, for overrides requiring unanimity, we expect that as the net number of member-state observations in favor of the plaintiff (defendant) increases, the likelihood that the Court rules for the plaintiff (defendant) increases (440).
The first sentence in this quote relates to override (though CGH immediately tell readers that they will assume that QM governs override in all cases); but the second sentence does not follow logically from the first. Through this trick -which drives much of their analysis and findings - we analyzed CGH's own aggregate data, in order to assess their broader theoretical claims. We report our findings here.
Quantitative Analysis
Article 258 infringement proceedings are brought by the Commission against a Member
State for alleged non-compliance with EU law (Appendix). These suits constitute the set of 18 Member States filed observations in just 8.8% (58/662) of the legal questions raised in these rulings. 19 After reading CGH's paper, we could not determine if or how their data analysis produced evidence in support of the claims made, which prompted this response. 20 CGH's research project was funded by a National Science Foundation grant, which requires recipients to share data collected. 21 In a ruling in which there is more than one legal question raised, there is no way for the analyst to identify one legal question from another. In those cases in which the Member States and the Commission briefed, and the Court decided, more questions than CGH identify and code, it is impossible to know which questions CGH left out. 22 CGH do not provide a key to how they have weighted each Member State, a problem given that CGH give different weights to the same Member State in different cases, presumably due to the effects of enlargement.
cases that are directly relevant to the question of whether the threats of non-compliance and override constrain the legal system. We read and coded all of these cases. Börzel, Hofman, and Panke (2008) collected comprehensive data on Article 258 actions and outcomes for the 1978-99 period, a time-frame that subsumes CGH's data. They report that the Commission brought more than 5,000 proceedings against the Member States; the vast majority of which were settled before being referred to the ECJ after the defendant agreed to change its law or practices. The Commission referred to the Court one-third of all cases (n=1,646), leading to a final ECJ judgment in slightly less than half of these (n=808). The ECJ found against the Member States in 95% of its Article 258 rulings (which is one reason why the settlement regime is so effective).
In "about 100 cases," the Commission brought a second action after the defendant Member State failed to comply with the ECJ's ruling. These cases either were then settled to the Commission's satisfaction, or the ECJ found against the MS a second time. reports similar results for rulings pursuant to all Article 258 actions against Member States in multiple domains of law. 26 We eliminate from our analysis, as CGH do, rulings that CGH code as missing data.
the QM procedure (the plaintiff "wins" in three of these cases, and "loses" in three). In all of these cases, the rule governing override was Unanimity, not QM. In only one Article 234 ruling CGH's claim to the contrary is therefore inexplicable.
---- Figure 1 here ----- success rate is far higher when it enables the ECJ (to punish a Member State) than when it seeks to constrain the Court (from finding against a Member States' law and practices), though it participates in the latter activity far more than in the former. We will return to these findings below, not least, in our discussion of CGH's assertion that they provide support for
Intergovernmentalism.
Qualitative Analysis
CGH restrict their inquiry to the quantitative analysis of the coded rulings. In contrast to every other political scientist who has undertaken empirical research on their topic, CGH do not supplement statistical analyses of briefs and rulings with thicker, descriptive analyses of the relationship between non-compliance and judicial process. There are several reasons why CGH's failure to do so renders their claims deeply suspect. First, using CGH's thin approach to law and judicial process, the analyst cannot distinguish between a profoundly important legal question, and a minor one. Whereas others took care to examine how prior case law (argumentation and precedent) structures litigation, identifying those rulings that are most important in generating future streams of litigation, CGH treat all issues and all rulings as if they were equally significant, and they do not follow-up on any ruling in their data set. Second, CGH do not examine the legal context of any dispute. has nothing to say on the question), and that if it were to do so in the future, liability must be provided for in EU legislation, not by judicial fiat. Comforting the Commission's position, the Court rejected the Member States' arguments. Citing its foundational rulings on direct effect and supremacy, the ECJ held that:
The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held responsible. The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community law. It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty [emphasis added].
As subsequently extended in Brasserie du Pecheur (1996) , 38 individuals are entitled to reparation when any EU legal norm is "intended to confer rights upon them, the breach is sufficiently serious, and there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the individuals." Where state liability is found, it is up to the national court to assess damages, to be determined by the domestic law of remedies, subject to certain conditions. In this complex ruling, 8 Member States and the Commission filed briefs on a wide range of issues, two of which deserve our attention. First, the ECJ dismissed a German objection in these terms:
The German Government ... submits that a general right to reparation for individuals could be created only by legislation and that for such a right to be recognized by judicial decision would be incompatible law. On the contrary, the Court stressed, EU law establishes certain minimal criteria, including the provision of certain remedial forms even when they are unknown in the national regime.
These cases have provoked a complex process of adaptation, on the part of national legal orders, accompanied by a steady case load to the Court.
We have not chosen these cases arbitrarily. Rather, these are cases "most likely" to conform to CGH's expectations. Yet the outcomes conflict with CGH's model of the legal system, while fitting comfortably the models they dismiss. These lines of case law have another quality in common. Each involves judicial lawmaking that congealed as a precedent-based, doctrinal framework which, in turn, organized future litigation that would propel the system forward. Such lawmaking is inexplicable under CGH's theory, and CGH have no account of how past rulings might influence future litigation. In the end, CGH tell readers nothing about why the cases in their data set came to the Court, how the Court adjudicated them, or how the Member States reacted to rulings, with what effects.
III. ANALYSIS (2): THE BRIEF FOR INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
In the last section, we showed that neither the quantitative evidence, nor the analysis of rulings taken in the face of direct political opposition, provide support for CGH's claims. If anything, the evidence strongly conflicts with both their theory and purported findings. We now turn to CGH's attempt to revive the contest between Intergovernmentalist and Neofunctionalist theories of integration, as applied to the EU's legal system. The debate, one would have thought, had been settled, in favor of the latter.
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CGH state (449) that their analysis supports Intergovernmentalist claims to the effect that "political constraints" -through mechanisms triggered by threats of override and noncompliance -"have large, systematic, and substantively significant effects on judicial decision 39 The literature is reviewed in Stone Sweet (2010) . making"; but the evidence conflicts with Neofunctionalist claims "that, while these constraints might matter on the margin, the court has had the latitude to pursue an agenda independent of and contrary to member-state governments' interests." Analysis of the cases in CGH's own data set demonstrate conclusively that the threat of override is not credible; the authors have not
shown that the threat of non-compliance has constrained the Court in any systematic way, if at all; and they do not discuss how the substantive development of any area of EU law has been stunted by their two mechanisms. Moreover, CGH neither test any specific hypothesis ever proposed by an Intergovernmentalist or Neofunctionalist, 40 nor do they engage the relevant scholarly literature that has put Intergovernmentalism to the test. In fact, no prior research project designed to test claims to the effect that Member State Governments constrain the evolution of the legal system (e.g., of Garrett 1993, and Tsebelis and Garrett 2001) Neofunctionalists also claim that the system has developed in a progressive, self-sustaining way, 40 In fact, CGH do not, in their paper, identify any Intergovernmentalist or Neofunctionalist by name.
in part, because the Court works to promote integration (values that inhere in the treaties) and, in part, because the decision rules governing Member State override are enabling, not constraining, of pro-integrationist positions taken by the Commission and the Court.
CGH (442) claim that "the ECJ may, at least on the margin, favor the Commission," but they argue that the real focus should be on the actors who systematically constrain the Court: the Member States. In contrast, a Neofunctionalist, if faced with this binary opposition, 41 would respond by predicting that the ECJ will side with the Commission, relatively systematically, and that the Member States will influence the Court on the margins, not least, as a supplement to the weight of the Commission. As shown above, the evidence from Article 258 rulings in their data set provide strong support for Neofunctionalist, and no support for the Intergovernmentalist, claims. 42 What about preliminary rulings under Article 267?
Let's assume that the CGH data set contains no errors. Of the 2,048 questions on which the ECJ rendered a ruling, the Commission filed observations in 77.7% (n=1588), whereas the Member States produced a weighted position in only 45.2% (n=926). In these cases, the Commission's success rate is far more impressive than that of the Member States. When the Commission takes the Plaintiff's side (n=841), the Court rules in favor of the plaintiff 79.9% of 41 Neofunctionalists would always supplement the analysis with consideration of the policy issues and interests at play in any case, as these are brought forward by the Commission, private litigants, and national courts. 42 To explain away why "the Court should not typically face threats of override" in the Article 258 setting, CGH (436) state that "the Commission normally brings an infringement charge against a member state on questions where a clear legal principle has emerged based on a series of previous cases. In other words, the Commission's position is normally based on an interpretation of EU law that has survived multiple opportunities for member states to challenge or amend it via legislative override." If anything, this is a Neofunctionalist, not an Intergovernmentalist, argument: the Court builds the law that the Commission exploits in the service of its own policy agenda. In fact, it is often the case that the Commission brings actions in order to induce the ECJ to build the law progressively, and the ECJ responds positively, a dynamic CGH do not consider. If the Article 258 system worked the way the CGH claim, then the Court's case law of "clear legal principles" would not have emerged in the first place, since such principles are typically built on findings of non-compliance in cases in which Member States rarely file observations (the Court should have been constrained in CGH's model). For Article 267 cases, if the legal system worked as CGH claim it does, then the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, and state liability would never have emerged in EU law, and most of the Article 267 cases, which are the majority of cases in their data set, would not exist.
the time, a result to be compared to the Member States lower 70.8% success rate in fewer cases (n=342).
----See Table 1 -----When the Commission files observations against the plaintiff (n=747), the ECJ rules in favor of the defendant 77.7% of the time, to be compared to the Member States far lower 57.2%
success rate in fewer cases (n=584).
----See Table 2 Tellingly, CGH report no findings on the questions raised in this section.
---- Table 3 -----
In an observation for the Plaintiff, the Defendant, or no observation at all.
---- Table 4 CGH's own data. We did so for the sake of argument and analysis, not because we think that CGH's approach to the EU's legal system makes sense or is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that CGH's data do not support any of their major claims. Rather, their paper seriously misrepresents how the EU's legal system works, as well as the state of knowledge in the field. Although the authors assert that the evidence marshaled from their data fundamentally challenges all of the important empirical research on their topic, in fact, the evidence supports, rather banally, the basic findings of every other serious empirical study ever undertaken. As we knew, the Commission is the dominant, non-judicial actor in the system, not and it tends to rule for the defendant Member State when its policies are shown to be more similar to those in place in a majority of Member States. Beginning in the 1980s, the Court asked the Commission to provide such information in its submission of materials to the ECJ on litigation before it. During the period studied by CGH, the Court routinely referenced these reports (on the extent of variance in national law relevant to the case before it). Moreover, in the area of sex equality, and Cichowski (2004 Cichowski ( , 2007 found that the ECJ regularly enacted, through its rulings, legislative proposals that had been blocked under unanimity rules, while being supported by the Commission and a majority of the Governments in In the most important class of cases falling under this heading, called "legal basis" disputes, the Court functions, in effect, as a constitutional jurisdiction, determining which legislative procedures must be used to adopt a particular piece of legislation. Second, the ECJ and the Court of First Instance (now known as the General Court) act as administrative courts: they review the lawfulness of acts taken by the EU's institutions at the behest of private parties. In
Article 263 actions, a Member State can never be a defendant.
Under Article 267 TFEU (formerly Article 177 TEC and Article 234 TEU), national judges send questions -in the form of a preliminary reference -to the ECJ in order to obtain an authoritative interpretation of EU law (of the Treaty, statutes, and so on) when EU law is material to the resolution of a dispute at national bar. The ECJ responds in the form of a judgment -called a preliminary ruling -which provides the interpretation of EU law that the referring judge is expected to apply. The provision was designed to promote the consistent application of EU law within national legal orders. With the consolidation of supremacy, direct effect, and related "constitutional" doctrines, Article 267 evolved as an autonomous, decentralized system for enforcing compliance. For a summary of the Court's "foundationalconstitutional" case law, as it relates to litigating EU law in the national courts, see Stone Sweet (2004: 64-71) . In Article 267 cases, the ECJ is activated by national judges, usually at the behest of private litigants seeking to vindicate rights or entitlements under EU law. At least indirectly, Member State non-compliance with EU law is often, but not always, at issue in these proceedings. 
Distribution of Net Weighted Positions taken by the Member States Questions in the CGH Data Set
The graph depicts the distribution of the major independent variable in CGH (2008) Entries refer to the briefs on legal questions raised by national judges in preliminary questions in the CGH dataset under Article 267 in the CGH dataset. Source of the Data: CGH (2008). 
